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The Dutch child-care sector is confronted with a transition from a welfare sector to a 
market sector. Policy makers assume that the introduction of market forces in the 
child-care sector increases efficiency and improves the balance between supply and 
demand. In discussions regarding the introduction of market forces in welfare-
oriented sectors, like the child-care sector, the possible effects for employees are 
usually not taken into consideration. The introduction of market forces in the child-
care sector might, however, influence the employee governance of child-care 
organisations, which might in turn have an effect on employee motivation. This paper 
describes and explains the effects of the introduction of market forces in the Dutch 
child-care sector on employee governance and employee motivation. The sample 
consists of 477 child-minders from 30 Dutch child-care organisations. The results 
show that child-care organisations differ in employee governance. Child-care 
organisations confronted with a high level of market forces are characterised by a 
tighter job design and offer a more attractive reward and career system than child-care 
organisations confronted with a low level of market forces. The differences in 
employee governance in turn positively affect extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic 
motivation is not affected.  
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1 Introduction 
The Dutch child-care sector is confronted with a transition from a welfare sector to a 
market sector. The transition process is in line with a trend in the care sector of most 
developed countries towards a more business-like approach and an accompanying 
attention to raise efficiency (Denton et al. 2002; Propper, Burgess and Green 2004). 
Even in traditionally welfare-oriented sectors, such as the care sector, market forces 
are introduced.  
Policy makers assume that the introduction of market forces in the Dutch care 
sector improves the balance between supply and demand and increases efficiency.  
Due to the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector, parents are 
expected to receive more possibilities of choice and the sector is expected to become 
more attractive for new suppliers (Ministerie van VWS 2000). In discussions 
regarding the introduction of market forces in care work the possible effects for 
employees are, however, usually not taken into consideration. The question is whether 
the possible effects on employees are rightly dismissed. What if the introduction of 
market forces in care work affects employee motivation? Given that care work is 
highly labour intensive, the performance of the care sector depends highly on the 
willingness and quality with which the employees working in this sector apply 
themselves to their tasks (Franco, Bennett and Kanfer 2002). In order to be able to 
predict the impact of the introduction of market forces in care work, it is therefore of 
utmost importance to have an understanding of the possible effects the introduction of 
market forces may have on employee motivation.  
In this paper we will describe and explain the effects of the introduction of 
market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on employee governance and employee 
motivation. The introduction of market forces in the child-care sector is expected to 
influence the employee governance of child-care organisations, which in turn is 
expected to affect employee motivation.  
The child-care sector is believed to be a good example to investigate the 
consequences of the transition from a welfare to a market sector on the work 
motivation of care-work employees. First of all, the child-care sector forms a 
representative example of the care sector as a whole with regard to sector specific 
characteristics like being highly labour intensive, having a high percentage of female 
employees and a large mount of part-time employees (Nivel, Prismant and OSA 
2003). Second, child-care employees are representative for other care-work 
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employees with regard to the motivation they derive from different aspects of their 
work. Both child-care and other care-work employees mention autonomy and work 
that is meaningful as the most important aspects of their work, while they are least 
motivated by the financial compensation and career perspectives (Lindsay and 
Lindsay 1987; Philips, Howes and Whitebook 1991). Finally, due to the introduction 
of a new law in the Dutch child-care sector, the whole child-care sector is forced to 
change in a very short period of time from a supply-financed welfare sector into a 
demand-driven market sector. The Dutch child-care sector therefore forms a unique 
case to analyse the consequences of the introduction of market forces in care work on 
the work motivation of care-work employees.   
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the introduction of 
market forces in the Dutch child-care sector. Section 3 presents the expected effects of 
the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on employee 
governance and employee motivation. In Section 4 the method section of the paper 
and in section 5 the results are given. The final section concludes. 
2 The introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector  
The supply of formal child care has grown enormously the past years in the 
Netherlands, from 20,000 child places in 1989 to over 100,000 child places ten years 
later (Ministerie van VWS 2000). Especially day care for children under four years of 
age is popular in the Netherlands, since it offers parents the opportunity to combine 
work and care. In 2003 over 100,000 child places were offered in Dutch day-care 
centres. Moreover, since most children in the Netherlands stay in day care only two or 
three days a week, the number of children that makes use of day care is much higher 
than the amount of child places available in day-care centres. In 2003 over 180,000 
children made use of day care, which was 22% of the total number of Dutch children 
under four years of age (Statistics Netherlands 2005).  
Over the years, the Dutch child-care sector has therefore evolved from a small 
sector with 8,000 employees in 1990 into a grown up sector employing over 60,000 
employees in 2003 (Statistics Netherlands 2001; 2005). The largest part of the work is 
conducted by the child-minders, who look after the children. Most of the child-
minders have a part-time contract, are female and are rather young. Almost half of the 
child-minders are below the age of thirty. The child-care sector therefore is one of the 
sectors with the highest percentage of women and the lowest average age of the 
employees (Hingstman et al. 2003).   
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The growth in the Dutch child-care sector has gone hand in hand with a 
transition from a welfare sector to a market sector. Market forces were slowly 
introduced in the Dutch child-care sector with the introduction of the Stimulative 
Measures on child care in 1990 (Turksema 2000). In the first place, the Stimulative 
Measures were aimed at increasing the supply of child care. In order to be able to 
afford the increase in growth in the child-care sector, the Dutch government tried to 
spread the costs of child care over three parties: the government, the parents and the 
employers. The government stimulated child-care organisations to sell child places to 
employers by granting subsidies to child-care organisations if and only if the child-
care organisation supplied so-called employer-financed child places. Since both 
subsidised and non-subsidised child-care organisations could supply employer-
financed child places, the Stimulative Measures offered the possibility for both 
subsidised and non-subsidised child-care organisations to claim subsidies (Pelzer 
1991). Furthermore, the Stimulative Measures stimulated new child-care 
organisations to enter the child care market. The Stimulative Measures therefore did 
not only increase the supply of child care but also had an increasing effect on the 
competition between child-care organisations.  
The decentralisation of the child-care policy to the municipalities on January 
first 1996, with the accompanying budgetary decrease and falling away of the 
Stimulative Measures, marked the next step from a welfare sector to a market sector. 
The child-care subsidies were no longer set specifically for child care but could be 
spend freely by municipalities. In addition, the municipalities were allowed to choose 
to work with any child-care organisation they would like; they were not restricted to 
grant subsidies to subsidised child-care organisations alone. Municipalities therefore 
started relationships with several child-care organisations and adopted more and more 
the position of a company who buys child places from a child-care organisation. As a 
consequence, child-care organisations were confronted with more competition and a 
pressure to raise efficiency. 
The last step in the transition from a welfare sector to a market sector took 
place with the introduction of a new Act on child care on January first 2005, the ‘Wet 
Kinderopvang’. With the introduction of the new Act on child care the financial 
organisation of the child-care sector changed from a system of supply-financing to a 
system of demand-financing. With the introduction of the new Act, the demand is 
subsidised instead of the supply and therefore the subsidy relationships between child-
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care suppliers and municipalities are ended. Moreover, since a demand-driven system 
implies a direct financial relationship between child-care suppliers and consumers, the 
selling prices have received much attention in child care and as a consequence, the 
cost price of child care has come to play a more central role.  
The introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector is expected to 
affect child-care organisations. Instead of being a non-profit company that can fall 
back on government subsidies, the introduction of market forces necessitates child-
care organisations to become independent businesses that are able to gain from the 
products they are selling. The question is what possibilities child-care suppliers have 
to deal with the changes in the child-care sector. How can child-care suppliers change 
the organisation of their work and alter the way they govern their employees in order 
to adjust to the demands of the market and to improve their financial position?  
Child-care organisations try to adjust to the demands of the market by offering 
services that other organisations do not offer such as longer or flexible opening hours 
or the provision of other products besides child care  (Dekker, Plantenga and Siegers 
2001). In doing this child-care organisations expect to improve their financial 
position. Other strategies that child-care organisations have at their disposal to 
improve their financial position are, for example, raising the prices of child care or 
decreasing costs by increasing efficiency (Turksema 2000). Since personnel costs are 
the most important cost factor in child care, an increase in focus on the cost price 
forces child-care organisations to use personnel efficiently. Moreover, in order to 
increase efficiency, child-care organisations need to redefine the way they govern 
their employees. The introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector is 
therefore expected to influence the employee governance of child-care organisations, 
which might in turn affect employee motivation. 
 
3 Effects on employee governance and employee motivation 
In this paper we presume that employee governance can be described by four 
elements: employment contracts, job design, reward system, and career system.5 
Child-care organisations are expected to change their employment contracts, job 
design, reward system, and career system in order to increase personnel efficiency. 
                                               
5
 The subdivision of employee governance into these four dimensions is taken from Glebbeek and Van 
der Lippe (2000). 
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An important efficiency measure is the extent to which the number of child-
minders is adjusted to the number of children present in the day-care centre. Since the 
number of children that is present in the day-care centre is not stable throughout the 
week, the number of child-minders that is necessary to look after these children needs 
to be flexible in order to be able to realise high personnel efficiency. By working with 
flexible employment contracts child-minders can, for example, be scheduled on days 
that are popular. Also by raising the tightness of the job design efficiency can be 
increased. Whenever there are less children present than expected, and therefore more 
child-minders are present on the group than required by law, requiring child-minders 
to take the day off or to work on different groups or at different locations will, for 
example, result in a more efficient use of the available employees.  
An increase in efficiency thus requires flexibility and effort from the child-
minders. In order to motivate child-minders to work hard, child-care organisations 
might therefore alter their reward and career system by focussing more on pay for 
performance. In addition, child-care organisations may increase financial rewards and 
improve the possibilities for development to attract and motivate personnel.  
All in all, the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector, and 
the accompanying pressure to increase efficiency, is expected to go hand in hand with 
an increase in: flexibility of employment contracts, tightness of job design, focus on 
pay for performance, and attractiveness of the reward and career system. It can be 
expected, however, that changes in employee governance will not leave the child-
minders unaffected.  
The changes in employee governance can be expected to have both positive 
and negative effects on the work motivation of the child-minders. An increase in 
financial rewards and possibilities for development can, for example, be expected to 
positively influence the work motivation of the child-minders, while an increase in 
flexibility and effort that is required from the child-minders might influence work 
motivation negatively. 
In order to be able to fully understand the consequences of the introduction of 
the market forces in the child-care sector on the work motivation of the child-minders 
it is important to distinguish between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. Research has 
shown that people do not only work for the money, but can also be motivated by the 
work itself (Deci 1975; Frey 1997). In most jobs, both rewards form an important 
source of motivation. Extrinsic rewards such as financial rewards and status trigger 
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the extrinsic motivation of the employee, while intrinsic rewards like having a job that 
is nice and offers you the possibilities to develop yourself trigger intrinsic motivation.  
Both forms of motivation are important. For the employer, having employees 
that are partly extrinsically motivated is important for the guidance of employees. 
Especially with regard to the unpleasant aspects of a job, the use of financial rewards 
works very well. In simple, repetitive manufacturing jobs extrinsically motivated 
employees will therefore work the hardest and the use of financial rewards can be 
recommended. Intrinsic motivation, on the other hand, is important too. First of all, 
intrinsically motivated employees have found to have a higher learning capacity than 
extrinsically motivated employees. Furthermore, laboratory experiments suggest that 
cognitively difficult tasks are better solved by intrinsically than by extrinsically 
motivated employees. Finally, intrinsically motivated employees are less costly with 
regard to disciplining them. They work well regardless of whether the employer is 
present or not, because the work itself is fulfilling. Especially in jobs that demand a 
high level of creativity from the employees and where monitoring costs are high, 
intrinsic motivation is therefore valuable (Frey 1993).  
The extent to which it is important to have extrinsically and intrinsically 
motivated employees thus differs from profession to profession. In order to optimally 
motivate employees, different jobs therefore need to offer different packages of 
extrinsic and intrinsic rewards. The care sector is known to be a sector that offers a 
high level of intrinsic rewards. In care work, the extent to which care work employees 
are able to care for their clients and have time to pay attention to their clients’ 
emotional needs and their clients or family members’ grief, is found to be a very 
important intrinsic reward of the job (Denton et al. 2002). Care-work employees 
therefore have found to be highly intrinsically motivated (Grunveld 1999), which is 
important given the difficulties in monitoring. Although in the care sector employers 
may be able to monitor how many clients are being treated daily, the quality with 
which they are being treated is less easy to observe. Intrinsic motivation is therefore 
very important to ensure a high quality in care work. 
The degree to which jobs offer extrinsic and intrinsic rewards differs, 
however, not only from profession to profession. Employees who are working in 
similar jobs can be confronted with different levels of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards 
due to differences in employee governance. One organisation might, for example, pay 
higher wages while another organisation might spend more money on education and 
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team building. The way in which the organisation is structured and the employees are 
governed therefore influences the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards that employees may 
derive from their job. Given that the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-
care sector is expected to influence employee governance, the introduction of market 
forces in the Dutch child-care sector may therefore also influence the extrinsic and 
intrinsic rewards and therewith the work motivation of the child-minders. 
An increase in flexibility of employment contracts is expected to negatively 
influence the extrinsic motivation of the child-minders, due to the fact that flexible 
employment contracts offer less job security and therewith less extrinsic rewards. An 
increase in flexibility of employment contracts is also expected to have a negative 
effect on the intrinsic motivation of the child-minders since it requires more flexibility 
from the child-minders, which might increase work pressure and decrease intrinsic 
rewards. An increase in tightness of design is not expected to influence the extrinsic 
motivation of the child-minders, while it is expected to decrease the intrinsic 
motivation due to an increase in work pressure. An increase in focus on pay for 
performance is also expected to increase work pressure and therewith to decrease 
intrinsic motivation. Since an increase in pay for performance might go together with 
an increase in extrinsic rewards due to an increase in performance feedback and 
higher financial rewards, an increase in pay for performance is expected to increase 
extrinsic motivation. An increase in attractiveness of the reward and career system is 
finally expected to increase both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation by offering higher 
financial rewards and possibilities for development. 
The introduction of market forces in the child-care sector is expected to 
influence the employee governance of child-care organisations, which in turn is 
expected to affect employee motivation. The changes in employee governance are 
expected to have both positive and negative consequences for the extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation of the child-minders. Beforehand the outcome of the introduction 
of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on the extrinsic and intrinsic 





The effects of a longitudinal process, the introduction of market forces in the Dutch 
child-care sector, are measured using cross-sectional data. The extent to which child-
care organisations in the sample are confronted with market forces is assumed to 
reflect the development of child-care organisations over time.  
The data collection took place from March to September 2004. As a first step 
in the data collection 38 child-care organisations were approached, differentiated with 
regard to degree of subsidies, size and urbanity. From the 38 organisations 30 
organisations are included in the final sample, a response of 79%. The second step 
involved face-to-face interviews with the managers of the child-care organisations. 
The managers of the 30 child-care organisations were sent a written questionnaire 
measuring the employee governance of the child-care organisation. When agreed 
upon by the manager, the answers given in the questionnaire were discussed with the 
manager in a face-to-face interview. The final step of the data collection involved the 
distribution of written questionnaires measuring the work motivation of the child-
minders. In total 1046 questionnaires were distributed among child-minders working 
in one of the day-care centres of the selected child-care organisations. From the 1046 
questionnaires 477 have returned, a response of 46%.6  
The final sample consists of 6 male and 471 female respondents. The average 
age of the child-minders is 32.3 (sd 9.9). The child-minders are working on average 
4.9 years for the present employer (sd 4.5) and on average have a contract for 27 
hours a week (sd 7.2). Most of the child-minders have a middle level education 
(81%), 1% of the child-minders has a lower education and 18% a higher education. Of 
the child-minders 38% has children living at home, and 68% of the child-minders is 





                                               
6
 The actual response rate might be slightly higher do to the fact that not all questionnaires that have 





Work motivation is measured by two variables: extrinsic motivation and intrinsic 
motivation. Extrinsic motivation is measured by a 4-item scale taken from Denton et 
al. (2002). On a five-point scale child-minders are asked to what extent they agree 
with the following statements: my benefits are good, my chances for promotion are 
good, my job security is good, and I feel that I am fairly paid (disagree completely 
(1), agree completely (5)). The scale has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.71. Intrinsic 
motivation is measured by a 2-item scale taken from Denton et al. (2002). One of the 
factors of the original 3-item scale (my job gives me a sense of purpose in life) is 
deleted from the scale in order to improve the reliability of the scale. The final scale 
consist of the items ‘I get a sense of accomplishment from my job’ and ‘my job is 
interesting’ and has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.66.  
 
Market forces 
The extent to which child-care organisations are confronted with market forces is 
measured by the amount of subsidies child-care organisations receive (reverse item). 
The extent to which the organisations are subsidised is measured by a self-constructed 
scale of five-items with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.76. The scale consists of items such 
as: whether the child-care organisation is currently part of a broader welfare 
organisation (no (0) yes (1)) and whether the child-care organisation currently has a 
subsidy relationship with the government (no (0) yes (1)). The scale is based on the z-
scores of the items. 
 
Employee governance  
The way child-care organisations govern their employees is measured by four aspects: 
the flexibility of employment contracts, the tightness of the job design, the attention 
that is paid to pay-for-performance in the reward and career system, and the 
attractiveness of the reward and career system. The flexibility of employment 
contracts is measured by the percentage of child-minders with a temporary contract, 
the tightness of the job design by the staff-child ratio.7 The higher the percentage of 
                                               
7
 The staff-child ratio is the ratio between the number of full-time child-minders and the number of 
children that are present during the opening hours of the day-care centre. 
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child-minders with a temporary contract, the higher the flexibility of employment 
contracts and the lower the staff-child ratio the tighter the job design. The attention 
that is paid to pay for performance in the reward and career system is measured by 
one item measuring whether organisations offer child-minders a higher wage for 
working above average (no (0) yes (1)). The attractiveness of the reward and career 
system is finally measured by a self-constructed scale of six-items with a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.70. The scale consists of items such as: the extent to which organisations 
offer child-minders the possibility to develop themselves through broadening their 
tasks or following courses (very little (1) very much (5)) and whether the child-care 
organisations pay child-minders a higher wage than required according to the 




In the analyses we control for both organisation and child-minder characteristics. The 
organisation characteristics included are: the size of the child-care organisation 
measured in terms of number of child places, whether the child-care organisation 
operates in the Western part of the Netherlands (Randstad), in an urban or in a rural 
area (urbanity), and the age of the child-care organisation. The child-minder 
characteristics included are: age, educational level, whether the child-minder has 
children or not, whether the child-minder has a partner or not, job tenure, and the 
number of hours the child-minder was working per week. 
4.3 Analyses 
Regression analysis is used to test whether the extent to which child-care 
organisations are confronted with market forces influences employee governance. The 
flexibility of employment contracts, the tightness of the job design, and the attention 
that is paid to pay-for-performance in the reward and career system is measured with 
dummy variables. Logistic regression analyses are therefore performed to explain the 
flexibility of employment contracts, tightness of job design, and focus on pay for 
performance. Ordinary regression analysis is performed to explain the attractiveness 
of the reward and career system.  
Given the hierarchical data structure (child-minders within child-care 
organisations) a multilevel approach is used to analyse whether there are differences 
in employee motivation between child-minders working in child-care organisations 
 11 
that are confronted with different levels of market forces.8 As a first step in the 
analysis, the empty model is estimated. In the empty model the intercept and the 
variances on organisation and employee level are estimated. Next, predictors are 
added to the model. The significance of the predictors is tested by computing the 
increase in model fit. The increase in model fit is represented by the decrease in 
deviance and follows a chi-square distribution with the number of added predictors as 
degrees of freedom (Goldstein 1995). In the analyses, only fixed effects are included.9 
The effects of the predictor variables are comparable with regression coefficients in 
ordinary regression (Van Yperen and Snijders 2000). The coefficients reported in the 
tables are unstandardised regression coefficients. Finally, checks of linearity are 
conducted. For predictor variables that do not describe a linear relationship with the 
dependent variables, categorised variables are included in the analyses. Furthermore, 
in order to obtain as many respondents as possible, missing values are included in the 
analyses with the use of dummies.10 
 
5 Results 
The child-care organisations in the sample differ with regard to employee governance. 
Information on the flexibility of employment contracts was available from 23 of the 
30 child-care organisations. The child-care organisations report that between 0% and 
38% of the child-minders do not have a permanent position. On average 15% of the 
child-minders are substitute workers. Most child-minders working in child care 
therefore have a fixed contract. The tightness of the job design, measured by the staff-
child ratio, was available from 22 of the 30 child-care organisations. The staff-child 
ratio in the organisations in the sample ranges from 0.11 to 0.30, with an average of 
0.20.11 A staff-child ratio of 0.20 means that there is about 1 full-time child-minder 
                                               
8
 Multilevel analysis is a type of regression analysis that takes the hierarchical structure of the data into 
account. Multilevel analysis is used because ordinary regression analysis may lead to unreliable results  
when applied to hierarchical data structures (e.g. employees within organisations) since the assumption 
of independent observations is violated (Snijders and Bosker 1999; Van Yperen and Snijders 2000).     
9
 The effects of predictor variables are fixed by default, that is, the effects of predictors are assumed not 
to differ between groups. In a multilevel analysis it is also possible to test whether the effects of 
predictors differs between groups, which is done by including random slopes. Since the inclusion of 
random slopes did not lead to a significant improvement of the model, random slopes are not included.   
10
 The dummy variables for the missing categories in the control variables are not reported in the 
analyses, but were tested and proven not to be significant. 
11
 The staff-child ratio is calculated on the basis of the formula of the MO Groep (2002). Differences in 
the staff-child ratio due to differences in the ages of the children are not taken into consideration. Since 
child-care organisations in the sample have a comparable composition of groups, the differences in 
staff-child ratio are not expected to be due to differences in age groups.   
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per 5 children. Since on average two child-minders are required on a group of twelve 
children aged between 0 and 4, that is a staff-child ratio of 0.17 is required for groups 
with children with mixed ages, the child-minders in the sample have on average less 
children under supervision than is required by the staff-child ratio requirements in the 
law (Ministerie van SZW 2002). With regard to the focus on pay for performance in 
the reward and career system reports 30% of the child-care organisations that child-
minders are sometimes financially rewarded for displaying an above average work 
effort. Child-minders are therefore not financially rewarded for displaying an above 
average work effort in 70% of the child-care organisations. Finally, child-care 
organisations report differences in the attractiveness of the reward and career system. 
With regard to the reward system, 14% of the child-care organisations claim to offer a 
reward that is higher than necessary according to the collective labour agreement, 
while 41% of the child-care organisations claim to offer a package of secondary 
conditions of employment that is higher than necessary according to the collective 
labour agreement. Child-care organisations finally differ with regard to the 
attractiveness of the career system due to differences in, for example, the possibilities 
that are offered to child-minders to follow courses. According to the child-care 
organisations in the sample the possibilities to follow courses differs from very little 
to very much. On average the child-care organisations claim to offer not little but also 
not many possibilities to follow courses.   
The question is whether the differences in employee governance can be 
explained by the extent to which child-care organisations are confronted with market 
forces. The introduction of market forces in the child-care sector was expected to 
influence the employee governance of child-care organisations. Child-care 
organisations confronted with a high level of market forces were expected to be 
characterised by a: higher flexibility of employment contracts, tighter job design, 
more focus on pay for performance, and a more attractive reward and career system 
than child-care organisations confronted with a low level of market forces.  
As Table 1 reveals, there is not much relation between the employee 
governance of child-care organisations and the extent to which child-care 
organisations are confronted with market forces. Given the low sample size (n=30) it 
is also very difficult to find significant results. The results indicate, however, that the 
extent to which child-care organisations are confronted with market forces is, as 
expected, positively related to the tightness of job design and the attractiveness of the 
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reward and career system of child-care organisations. Table 1 shows that child-care 
organisations that receive little subsidies display a significantly higher (p <.10) 
tightness of job design and attractiveness of the reward and career system than highly 
subsidised child-care organisations. Relationships between the extent to which child-
care organisations are confronted with market forces and the flexibility of 
employment contracts and the focus on pay for performance in the reward and career 
system are not found. In fact, these relations even point in the opposite direction of 
what was expected.    
 




















reward & career 
system 
(very low.very high) 
 
B (s.e.) 
Control variables     
Urbanity (low.. high)   .207 (.464) .926 (.562) .105 (.505) .346 (.798) 
Size organisation (low.. high)   .114 (.490) .460 (.571) -.307 (.533) -1.106 (.851) 
Age organisation  
(low=0, high=1)   
.297 (.908) .623 (1.057) .456 (.988) -1.116 (1.580) 
     
Marketisation     
Subsidies org 1 (much) 
(reference) 
. . . . 
Subsidies org 2 (average) -.099 (.966) .482 (1.113) -.897 (1.029) .881 (1.724) 
Subsidies org 3 (little) -.572 (1.003) 2.067+ (1.232) -1.158 (1.084) 2.975+ (1.722) 
     
N 30 30 30 30 
+ p < .10. 
 
Employee governance is in turn expected to affect employee motivation. Employee 
governance is expected to influence the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards that child-
minders derive from their job and therewith the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of 
the child-minders. The flexibility of employment contracts is expected to be 
negatively related and the attractiveness of the reward and career system is expected 
to be positively related to extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. The tightness of the job 
design is expected to be unrelated to extrinsic motivation and negatively related to 
                                               
12
 Logistic regression analyses are performed to explain the flexibility of employment contracts, 
tightness of job design, and focus on pay for performance. Ordinary regression analysis is performed to 
explain the attractiveness of the reward and career system.  
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intrinsic motivation, while pay for performance is expected to be positively related to 
extrinsic and negatively related to intrinsic motivation.  
Table 2 displays the relationships between the employee governance of child-
care organisations and the work motivation of the child-minders. Columns one and 
three show that the child-minders in the sample are more intrinsically than 
extrinsically motivated. The child-minders in the sample display a high intrinsic 
motivation (intercept 4.42) and a moderate extrinsic motivation (intercept 3.23). The 
motivation level of the child-minders is equivalent to the motivation level that was 
found in earlier research among home care workers (Denton et al. 2002).  
The results further show that there is little variance on organisation level for 
both types of motivation. The intrinsic motivation of the child-minders even exhibits 
no variance on organisation level at all and is therefore foremost explained by 
individual factors. In fact, the intrinsic motivation of the child-minders is not 
significantly affected by the employee governance of child-care organisations. All 
employee governance items are negatively related to intrinsic motivation, however, 
none of the coefficients is significant. 
The extrinsic motivation of the child-minders is influenced by the employee 
governance of the child-care organisation. Child-minders who work in a child-care 
organisation characterised with a high flexibility of employment contracts report, as 
expected, a significantly lower (p < .01) extrinsic motivation than child-minders who 
work in a child-care organisation characterised with a low flexibility of employment 
contracts, while the attractiveness of the reward and career system positively 
influences (p < .01) the extrinsic motivation of the child-minders as expected. The 
tightness of the job design was not expected to influence the extrinsic motivation of 
the child-minders and also no significant relationship was found. A high focus on pay 
for performance in the reward and career system was finally expected to have a 
positive effect on extrinsic motivation. Again no significant relationship was found, 






Table 2: Effects of employee governance on employee motivation (unstandardised coefficients)13 
Variables Extrinsic motivation 
(very low.very high) 
Entry B (s.e.) 
Extrinsic 
motivation 
Final B (s.e.) 
Intrinsic motivation 
(very low.very high) 
Entry B (s.e.) 
Intrinsic 
motivation 
Final B (s.e.) 
Empty model     
Intercept 3.228 (.059) 3.494 (.167) 4.424 (.027) 4.628 (.134) 
Variance organisation .064* (.027) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Variance employee .534** (.036) .503 **(.033) .352** (.023) .327** (.021) 
     
Control variables  
employee level 
    
Age 1 (< 25)  (reference)  .  . 
Age 2 (25-39)  -.213* (.092)  -.006 (.074) 
Age 3 (>39)  -.120 (.113)  .130 (.091) 
Job tenure 1 (>5 = 1)   -.079 (.073)  -.030 (.059) 
Education (low = 0, high = 1)  -.255** (.091)  -.133 (.074) 
Partner (no = 0, yes =1)  .109 (.080)  -.166** (.064) 
Children (no = 0, yes=1)  .209* (.085)  .218** (.069) 
Size contract 1 (< 20)  .121 (.122)  -.193* (.098) 
Size contract 2 (20-34)   .174 (.091)  -.078 (.073) 
Size contract 3 (> 34) 
(reference) 
 .  . 
     
Control variables 
organisation level 
    
Urbanity (low.. high)    -.097* (.045)  -.015 (.036) 
Size organisation (low.. high)    -.018 (.050)  -.024 (.041) 
Age organisation  
(low=0, high=1)   
 .086 (.080)  .126* (.064) 
     
Employee governance     
Flexibility employment 
contracts 
    
Percentage substitute workers  
(< average = 0,> average = 1)  
 -.283 **(.085)  -.101 (.069) 
Percentage substitute workers  
(missing = 1) 
 -.346** (.104)  -.112 (.084) 
Tightness job design     
Staff-child ratio   
(> average = 0,< average = 1)  
 .097 (.079)  -.037 (.064) 
Staff-child ratio   
(missing = 1) 
 .140 (.112)  .057 (.090) 
Pay for performance 
 reward & career system 
    
Payment for good 
performance (no = 0, yes=1) 
 -.143 (.081)  -.089 (.066) 
Attractiveness  
reward & career system 
    
Attractiveness  
(very low .. very high) 
 .041** (.010)  -.006 (.008) 
Deviance 1080.05 1021.45** 852.24 817.34** 
R² . .06 . .07 
N 475 475 475 475 
** p < .01, * p  < .05. 
                                               
13
 Multilevel analysis is performed to explain extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. Columns 1 and 3 
report the empty model. Columns 2 and 4 report the effects of the control variables and employee 
governance on employee motivation.  
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Finally, we tested whether the extent to which child-care organisations are confronted 
with market forces affects employee motivation. The introduction of market forces in 
the child-care sector was expected to influence the employee governance of child-care 
organisations, which in turn was expected to affect employee motivation. Since the 
changes in employee governance were expected to have both positive and negative 
consequences for the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the child-minders, the 
outcome of the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on the 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the child-minders was not clear beforehand. 
As is shown in Table 3, the extent to which child-care organisations are 
confronted with market forces is, as expected, positively related to the extrinsic 
motivation of child-minders. The first column of Table 3 shows that the degree of 
subsidies that child-care organisations receive is negatively related to the extrinsic 
motivation of the child-minders. Child-minders working in organisations that are 
confronted with low market forces thus report a significantly lower (p < .01) extrinsic 
motivation than child-minders working in child-care organisations that are confronted 
with a high level of market forces. Table 3 further shows that the intrinsic motivation 
of child-minders is not influenced by the extent to which child-care organisations are 
confronted with market forces. As displayed in the third column of Table 3, the 
degree of subsidies that child-care organisations receive is, as expected, positively 
related to the intrinsic motivation of the child-minders, however, this relationship is 
not significant. 
The effect of marketisation on employee motivation is finally expected to be 
mediated by employee governance. The second and fourth column of Table 3 show 
that if governance structure items are added to the analysis, the relationship between 
market forces and extrinsic motivation indeed weakens.14 The degree of subsidies that 
child-care organisations receive is no longer significantly related to the extrinsic 
motivation of the child-minders. Employee governance therefore mediates the effect 
of market forces on extrinsic motivation as expected. 
                                               
14
 We have checked whether the relationship between market forces and extrinsic motivation also 
disappears when the dummies for the missing values of the flexibility of employment contracts and 
tightness of job design are left out of the analysis. This is the case, indicating that the relationship 
between market forces and extrinsic motivation is mediated by employee governance and not by the 
dummies for the missing values of the flexibility of employment contracts and tightness of job design. 
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Table 3: Effects of marketisation on employee motivation (unstandardised coefficients) 15 
Variables Extrinsic motivation 
(very low.very high) 
Entry B (s.e.) 
Extrinsic 
motivation 
Final B (s.e.) 
Intrinsic motivation 
(very low.very high) 
Entry B (s.e.) 
Intrinsic 
motivation 
Final B (s.e.) 
Control variables  
employee level 
    
Age 1 (< 25)  (reference) . . . . 
Age 2 (25-39) -.199* (.093) -.213* (.092) -.008 (.074) -.006 (.074) 
Age 3 (>39) -.049 (.115) -.111 (.114) .123 (.091) .119 (.091) 
Job tenure 1 (>5 = 1)  -.006 (.075) -.058 (.076) -.051 (.059) -.056 (.061) 
Education (low = 0, high = 1) -.234* (.093) -.249** (.092) -.137 (.074) -.140 (.074) 
Partner (no = 0, yes =1) .076 (.082) .100 (.080) -.151* (.065) -.154* (.065) 
Children (no = 0, yes=1) .189* (.087) .205* (.085) .218** (.069) .223** (.069) 
Size contract 1 (< 20) .111 (.125) .140 (.123) -.223* (.099) -.216* (.099) 
Size contract 2 (20-34)  .170 (.093) .185* (.092) -.100 (.073) -.091 (.074) 
Size contract 3 (> 34) 
(reference) 
. . . . 
     
Control variables 
organisation level 
    
Urbanity (low.. high)   -.121* (.056) -.103 (.046) -.025 (.034) -.007 (.037) 
Size organisation (low.. high)   -.072 (.059) -.018 (.050) -.020 (.036) -.024 (.041) 
Age organisation  
(low=0, high=1)   
-.003 (.095) .090 (.080) .059 (.056) .120 (.064) 
     
Marketisation     
Subsidies organisation  
(very low .. very high)  
-.038** (.014) -.012 (.013) .011 (.009) .015 (.011) 
     
Employee governance     
Flexibility employment 
contracts 
    
Percentage substitute workers  
(< average = 0,> average = 1)  
 -.269** (.087)  -.118 (.070) 
Percentage substitute workers  
(missing = 1) 
 -.337** (.104)  -.122 (.084) 
Tightness job design     
Staff-child ratio   
(> average = 0,< average = 1)  
 .077 (.082)  -.012 (.066) 
Staff-child ratio   
(missing = 1) 
 .121 (.113)  .081 (.091) 
Pay for performance 
 reward & career system 
    
Payment for good 
performance (no = 0, yes=1) 
 -.145 (.081)  -.087 (.066) 
Attractiveness  
reward & career system 
    
Attractiveness  
(very low .. very high) 
 .036** (.012)  .000 (.009) 
Deviance 1041.23** 1020.57** 821.19** 815.31 
R² .05 .06 .06 .07 
N 475 475 475 475 
** p (2) < .01, * p (2) < .05. 
                                               
15
 Multilevel analysis is performed to explain extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. Columns 1 and 3 
report the effects of the control variables and marketisation on employee motivation. In columns 2 and 
4 employee governance is included in the analysis to test whether employee governance mediates the 
effect of marketisation on employee motivation. 
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6 Conclusion 
This paper described and explained the effects of the introduction of market forces in 
the Dutch child-care sector on employee governance and employee motivation. The 
question was raised, whether the possible effects on employee motivation of the 
introduction of market forces in care work were rightly dismissed. It was argued that 
given that the performance of the care sector depends highly on the willingness and 
quality with which care-work employees apply themselves to their tasks it is of 
utmost importance to have an understanding of the possible effects the introduction of 
market forces may have on employee motivation.  
The introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector was expected 
to influence the employee governance of child-care organisations, which in turn was 
expected to affect the work motivation of child-minders. To test whether our 
expectations were met we made use of a sample consisting of 477 child-minders from 
30 Dutch child-care organisations. 
First, the expectation that the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-
care sector influences employee governance was tested. Child-care organisations 
confronted with a high level of market forces were expected to be characterised by a 
higher flexibility of employment contracts, tighter job design, more focus on pay for 
performance, and a more attractive reward and career system. The results show that 
child-care organisations confronted with a high level of market forces are, as 
expected, characterised by a tighter job design and offer a more attractive reward and 
career system than child-care organisations confronted with a low level of market 
forces. Relationships between the level of market forces the child-care organisation is 
confronted with and the flexibility of employment contracts and focus on pay for 
performance were not found. 
Second, we have tested to what extent employee governance affects employee 
motivation. The flexibility of employment contracts was expected to be negatively 
related and the attractiveness of the reward and career system was expected to be 
positively related to extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. The tightness of the job design 
was expected to be unrelated to extrinsic motivation and negatively related to intrinsic 
motivation, while pay for performance was expected to be positively related to 
extrinsic and negatively related to intrinsic motivation. The results show that 
employee governance does not affect intrinsic motivation. Employee governance is, 
however, related to extrinsic motivation. As expected, the flexibility of employment 
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contracts is negatively related and the attractiveness of the reward and career system 
is positively related to extrinsic motivation.  
Finally, we have tested whether the extent to which child-care organisations 
are confronted with market forces affects employee motivation and whether this effect 
is mediated by employee governance. Since the changes in employee governance 
were expected to have both positive and negative consequences for the extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation of the child-minders, the outcome of the introduction of market 
forces in the Dutch child-care sector on the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the 
child-minders was beforehand not clear. The results show that child-minders working 
in child-care organisations confronted with a high level of market forces report a 
higher extrinsic motivation than child-minders working in child-care organisations 
confronted with a low level of market forces. This effect is mediated by employee 
governance. The extent to which child-care organisations are confronted with market 
forces does not affect the intrinsic motivation of the child-minders. 
All in all, the results presented in this paper show that the introduction of 
market forces in the Dutch child-care sector influences employee governance, which 
in turn affects employee motivation. This study has, however, two important 
limitations. First, the effects of a longitudinal process, the introduction of market 
forces in the Dutch child-care sector, are measured using cross-sectional data. The 
extent to which child-care organisations in the sample are confronted with market 
forces is assumed to reflect the development of child-care organisations over time. 
Given the small differences in employee governance between the child-care 
organisations in the sample one may question whether the child-care organisations in 
the sample indeed reflect the development of child-care organisations over time. The 
differences between child-care organisations might have declined so much over time 
that at the time of the data collection the differences between child-care organisations 
were too small to find significant results. By incorporating measurements of changes 
over time into the analysis, a better understanding of the effects that the introduction 
of market forces in the child-care sector has on employee governance and employee 
work motivation is expected to be received. 
Second, the relationship between employee governance and employee 
motivation might be more complicated than presumed in this paper. In this paper a 
direct relationship between rewards and motivation is presumed. If a change in 
employee governance increases extrinsic rewards, extrinsic motivation is also 
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expected to increase. Similarly, an increase in intrinsic rewards is expected to increase 
in intrinsic motivation. From previous research we know, however, that a change in 
extrinsic rewards not only influences extrinsic motivation, but may also influence 
intrinsic motivation by way in which the change in extrinsic rewards is perceived. The 
phenomenon that extrinsic rewards may negatively influence intrinsic motivation was 
first brought forward in psychology (Deci 1975) and is known as ‘the hidden cost of 
reward’ or ‘the corruption effect of extrinsic motivation’ (Frey and Osterloh 2002, p. 
13). Bruno Frey has introduced the phenomenon in economics under the term 
‘crowding-out’ effect (Frey 1997). By incorporating extrinsic and intrinsic rewards in 
the analysis it will be possible to disentangle to what extent employee governance 
affects the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards that employees derive from their job and to 
what extent these rewards affect extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. In doing this a 
better understanding of the effects of employee governance on employee motivation 
is expected to be received. 
Despite the limitations, what is clear from this study is that the introduction of 
market forces in the Dutch child-care sector influences the work motivation of the 
child-minders. All in all, the results indicate that the positive effects of the 
introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector seem to outweigh the 
negative effects. The question is whether the results are specific for the Dutch child-
care sector or whether these effects can be expected in other care sectors too. Further 
research is needed to receive a better understanding of the conditions under which 
changes in care work positively or negative influence the extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation of care-work employees. The introduction of market forces in the Dutch 
child-care sector, however, shows that it is possible to change the balance between 
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